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Screening for Inhalational Anthrax Due to Bioterrorism:
Evaluating Proposed Screening Protocols
John M. Howell,1 Thom A. Mayer,1 Dan Hanfling,1 Allan Morrison,2 Glenn Druckenbrod,1 Cecele Murphy,1 Robert Cates,1
and Denis Pauze1
1Department of Emergency Medicine and 2Division of Infectious Diseases, Inova Fairfax Hospital, Falls Church, Virginia
Eleven known cases of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax (IA) were treated in the United States during 2001. We
retrospectively compared 2 methods that have been proposed to screen for IA [1, 2]. The 2 screening protocols for IA were
applied to the emergency department charts of patients who presented with possible signs or symptoms of IA at Inova Fairfax
Hospital (Falls Church, Virginia) from 20 October 2001 through 3 November 2001. The Mayer criteria [1] would have screened
4 patients (0.4%; 95% CI, 0.1%–0.9%) and generated charges of $1900. If 29 patients (2.6%; 95% CI, 1.7%–3.7%) with 5
symptoms (but without fever and tachycardia) were screened, charges were $13,325. The Hupert criteria [2] would have
screened 273 patients (24%; 95% CI, 22%–27%) and generated charges of $126,025. In this outbreak of bioterrorism-related
IA, applying the Mayer criteria would have identified both patients with IA and would have generated fewer charges than
applying the Hupert criteria.
Eleven known cases of bioterrorism-related inhalational an-
thrax (IA) were treated in the United States during October
and November 2001. After its analysis of 10 of these cases, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued di-
agnostic criteria for evaluating persons with possible IA [3].
The CDC criteria suggested that both a documented history of
environmental or occupational exposure and clinical signs and
symptoms of the disease were required for screening and treat-
ment. Mayer et al. [1] retrospectively analyzed the 11 known
cases of bioterrorism-related IA and applied the CDC criteria
in an effort to determine whether these criteria would identify
patients with IA. This analysis revealed that the CDC criteria
would have selected 1 of the 11 anthrax cases for further di-
agnostic study or treatment. The CDC diagnostic criteria were
revised to include a history of either environmental or occu-
pational exposure and the presence of 5 symptoms of the
disease, plus fever and tachycardia (figure 1). These revised
criteria would have selected 8 of the 11 anthrax cases for screen-
ing and treatment.
Hupert et al. [2] proposed a screening protocol entitled
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“Rapid Identification of Presumptive Cases of Inhalational An-
thrax in the Setting of a Mass-Prophylaxis Campaign” (figure
2). In an effort to identify the utility of each of these screening
protocols, we assessed their ability to identify patients with IA
who presented to a large emergency department in which 2
documented cases of IA were successfully diagnosed and treated
during the October–November 2001 outbreak in the Washing-
ton, D.C., area. We also assessed the total number of patients
who would have been screened by these protocols, as well as
the cost for such screening. Specifically, the questions we eval-
uated were: (1) Would applying each of these diagnostic ap-
proaches identify the patients with IA? (2) How many patients
would be screened using each approach? (3) What are the fi-
nancial charges of such screening?
METHODS
The research protocol was approved by the Inova Fairfax Hos-
pital Institutional Review Board (Falls Church, VA). By con-
sensus, we developed a list of emergency medicine diagnoses
from the International Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision
(ICD-9; table 1), that included all known symptoms and clinical
presentations of acute pulmonary anthrax. With use of these
IDC-9 diagnoses, we retrospectively reviewed emergency de-
partment patient records at Inova Fairfax Hospital for patients
presenting from 20 October 2001 through 7 November 2001.
This study period was the time period immediately after the
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Figure 1. Revisions to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention interim guidelines. AMS, altered mental status; CXR, chest radiograph; HR,
heart rate; IA, inhalational anthrax; LP, lumbar puncture; T, temperature. *Feature not previously known to be associated with IA. Adapted and expanded
from [2].
distribution of anthrax-contaminated letters through the US
Postal Service and the diagnosis of IA in 5 patients who worked
and resided in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The
Inova Fairfax Hospital emergency department is a level I trauma
center, comprising an annual census of 72,000 adult and pe-
diatric patients. We extracted data from those patient records
that were identified by the screening process and entered these
data into an Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel 1997).
Table 2 lists the data extracted from each patient record.
Clinical data were assumed to be present if they were listed in
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Figure 2. The Cornell protocol [2] applied to 1127 patients with symptoms of and/or exposure to inhalational anthrax (IA) presenting to emergency
departments and evaluated during the 2001 bioterrorism-related outbreak of IA. IA pts, number of patients with documented inhalational anthrax;
n, number of patients with symptoms of and/or exposure to IA.
the triage note, vital signs, patient history and physical ex-
amination results, or nursing notes, including fever (temper-
ature, 38C) or tachycardia (heart rate, 100 beats/min or
greater than local age-defined limits for children). The per-
centages of subjects with each clinical symptom (table 2) were
calculated from the total number of audited charts, not the
total emergency department census for that time period.
Table 3 lists the data extracted from each patient record. The
proposed revision of clinical criteria [3] defined a patient as
eligible for pulmonary anthrax screening if he or she had either
(1) a history of exposure to either a known or a suspected
anthrax source, (2) a high-risk occupation (e.g., postal worker
or Senate staff), or (3) fever and tachycardia and 5 clinical
symptoms (table 3).
We defined charges for anthrax screening as those associated
with 1 complete blood cell count with manual differential, 1
set of aerobic and anaerobic blood cultures, and 1 posterior-
anterior (with lateral) chest radiograph per patient. We did not
include charges for chest CT, because these studies were per-
formed only if chest radiograph findings or other clinical data
strongly suggested IA. Charges for antibiotic prophylaxis were
calculated by assuming that all patients who were identified by
the screening protocols would be treated with generic doxy-
cycline for 10 days or until blood culture results were confirmed
to be negative. Drug charges were taken from Red Book 2002:
Drug Topics [4]. Charges included hospital and professional
fees. Charges were calculated using local values in 2003 US
dollars. Descriptive statistics and 95% CIs were calculated. Data
were analyzed using Minitab software, version 13.32 (Minitab).
RESULTS
During the study period, the daily emergency department cen-
sus averaged 27% more than the mean daily emergency de-
partment census prior to the bioterrorism events of 2001. The
total emergency department census during the study period
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Table 1. International Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision
(ICD-9), codes used to identify for review the records of patients
presenting to emergency departments with possible cases of in-
halational anthrax.
Diagnosis Code
Anthrax, Pulmonary 022.1
Anthrax NOS 022.9
Septicemia NOS 038.9
Meningitis, Viral NOS 047.9
Infection, Viral NOS 079.99
Meningitis NOS 322.9
Pharyngitis, Acute 462
Croup 464.4
Infect Up RSprt MLT Sites, Acute NOS 465.9
Bronchitis, Acute 466.0
Bronchio Acute D/T Oth Infct Organism 466.19
Sinusitis, Chronic NOS 473.9
Abscess, Peritonsillar 475
Disease, Nasal Cavity and Sinus NEC 478.1
Pneumonia, Organism NOS 486
Influenza with respiratory manifestations NEC 487.1
Bronchitis NOS 490
Bronchitis, Obstructive Chronic with Exacerbation 491.21
Emphysema NEC 492.8
Asthma NOS without Status Asthmaticus 493.90
Gastroenteritis/Colitis Noninfectious NEC 558.9
Syncope and Collapse 780.2
Fever 780.6
Malaise and Fatigue NEC 780.79
Headache 784.0
Shortness of Breath 786.05
Wheezing 786.07
Abnormality, Respiratory 786.09
Hemoptysis 786.3
Cough 786.2
Pain, Chest NOS 786.50
Painful Respiration 786.52
Pain, Chest NEC 786.59
Hiccough 786.8
Symp Inv Respiratory Syst/Chest NEC 786.9
Nausea and Vomiting 787.01
Nausea Alone 787.02
Vomiting Alone 787.03
Diarrhea NOS 787.91
Pain, Abdominal, Site NOS 789.00
Pain, Abdominal, Right Upper Quadrant 789.01
Pain, Abdominal, Left Upper Quadrant 789.02
Pain, Abdominal, Right Lower Quadrant 789.03
Pain, Abdominal, Left Lower Quadrant 789.04
Pain, Abdominal, Periumbilic 789.05
Pain, Abdominal, Epigastric 789.06
Pain, Abdominal, Site NEC 789.09
Table 2. Number of patients presenting to emergency depart-
ments with clinical symptoms referable to acute pulmonary an-
thrax, with associated charges.
No. of
symptoms
No. of
patients
screened
Percentage of
patients screened
(95% CI)
(n p 1127)
Associated
charges, US$
6 4 0.4 (0.1–0.9) 1,699.96
5 29 2.6 (1.7–3.7) 8,924.79
4 71 6.3 (4.9–7.9) 30,174.29
3 240 21.3 (18.9–23.8) 101,997.60
2 681 60.4 (57.4–63.3) 289,418.19
1 1047 92.9 (91.3–94.3) 444,964.53
NOTE. Each patient screened was assumed to receive 1 complete blood
cell count, 1 posterior-anterior and lateral chest radiograph, 1 set of blood
cultures, and a 10-day course of generic doxycycline (100 mg b.i.d.).
was 4259 patients. Of these, 1127 patients (26.5%; 95% CI,
25.1%–27.8%) had ICD-9 codes consistent with any signs or
clinical presentations of IA. Each of these charts was reviewed
under both of the screening protocols. The mean patient age
was 35.1 years (95% CI, 33.5–36.7 years). A total of 513 (45.5%)
of the patient records were for male patients (95% CI, 42.7%–
48.4%). Two (0.2%) of the patients received a diagnosis of acute
pulmonary anthrax (95% CI, 0.02%–0.6%). Table 2 shows the
number of patient charts that listed each of 6 different clinical
symptoms and shows the associated screening charges. Four
patients (0.4%; 95% CI, 0.1%–0.9%) had5 clinical symptoms
and fever and tachycardia (2 of these patients had pulmonary
anthrax). Two hundred fifty patients (22.2%; 95% CI, 19.8%–
24.7%) had high-risk occupations (i.e., they were either postal
workers or senate staff). Nine patients (0.8%; 95% CI, 0.4%–
1.5%) had a history of exposure to anthrax or a suspected
anthrax substance. Eight of the 9 individuals who had a history
of anthrax exposure were also members of the high occupa-
tional risk group. Of the subjects with occupational risk for
pulmonary anthrax (i.e., postal workers and senate staff em-
ployees), 11 had4 clinical symptoms, and 239 had !4 clinical
symptoms.
Of the 1127 patients, 4 (0.4%; 95% CI, 0.1%–0.9%) had5
symptoms of IA plus fever and tachycardia, including both of
the patients with documented IA disease. Using the revised
CDC criteria to screen and treat these patients would have
resulted in charges of $1900. Twenty-nine patients (2.6%; 95%
CI, 1.7%–1.7%) who had 5 symptoms did not have fever
and tachycardia. Screening and treating these patients would
have resulted in charges of $13,325. The protocol suggested by
Hupert et al. [2] would result in 273 (24%; 95% CI, 22%–
27%) of 1127 patients being screened and treated, including
both of the patients with IA. The cost of this screening would
have been $126,025 (table 4).
DISCUSSION
Because the spectre of bioterrorism moved from a possibility
to a reality in the fall of 2001, many voices have called for a
proactive approach to providing clinical guidelines for the di-
agnosis and treatment of IA, as well as of other agents that
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Table 3. Clinical data extracted from emergency department
records from 20 October 2001 through November 2001.
Age
Sex
Occupation
Presence of fever
Presence of tachycardia
History of exposure to a known or suspected anthrax substance
Clinical symptoms of fever, sweats, fatigue, cough, chest
discomfort, nausea, vomiting, headache, dyspnea, myalgias,
abdominal pain, or confusion
Clinical diagnosis
Presence of abnormal findings of a lung examination
Table 4. Comparison of screening guidelines in terms of the total number and percentages
of patients screened for inhalational anthrax (IA) and the associated charges.
Screening guideline
Identified
patients
with IA
No. of
patients
screened
Percentage of
patients screened
(95% CI)
Associated
charges, US$
Inova Fairfax protocol [1] Yes 4 0.4 (0.1–0.9) 1900
Cornell protocol [2] Yes 273 24 (21.7–26.9) 126,025
Presence of 3 clinical symptoms Yes 240 21.3 (18.9–23.8) 102,000
Possible occupational and/or
environmental exposure Yes 250 22 (20–25) 106,250
could potentially be used in a bioterrorist attack [1–7]. The
study by Danzig [6] calls specifically for the development of
such guidelines, as well as for the development of training
scenarios for responding to outbreaks involving agents that
might potentially be used in future bioterrorist attacks. For-
tunately, as the 2001 outbreak showed, IA is a serious but
treatable disease if it is detected and treated early in its course.
The development of screening and treatment protocols in-
creases in importance when one considers the phenomenon of
“reload,” as delineated by Danzig [6] in a penetrating and in-
sightful study commissioned by the National Defense Univer-
sity for the Department of Defense. Reload refers to the likely
ability of attackers using biological weapons to avoid detection
and “stockpile or replenish resources that permit repeated at-
tack” [6, p. 2]. Thus, although making a kilogram of weapon-
ized anthrax in the 1–5 micron range presents certain technical
challenges, as Danzig indicates, “it is not a significant challenge
for a terrorist organization that can make a kilogram to make
10 or 100 kilograms” [6, p. 2]. The phenomenon of reload thus
raises the unpleasant but distinct possibility of large-scale atmo-
spheric distribution of anthrax spores in multiple cities, either
simultaneously or sequentially. Without planning scenarios and
screening and treatment protocols, the surge capacity of the
health care system (and of emergency departments, in partic-
ular) would be overwhelmed. Simply stated, given the phe-
nomenon of reload, without effective screening and treatment
protocols, our health care system would go quickly from “re-
load” to “overload.” Our study evaluated existing screening and
treatment protocols for patients who had possibly been exposed
to IA by comparing them with a population of patients seen
at one of the primary treatment facilities for patients with IA
in the Washington, D.C., area after the October 2001 bioter-
rorism-related outbreak.
The criteria proposed by Mayer et al. [1] (the Inova Fairfax
protocol) and by Hupert et al. [2] (the Cornell protocol) were
each attempts to provide clear and concise screening mecha-
nisms for the large number of patients likely to present for
diagnosis and therapy after a bioterrorism-related outbreak. In
an attempt to clarify the utility and cost of using the Inova
Fairfax and Cornell protocols to screen and identify patients
for treatment after possible exposure to Bacillus anthracis, we
assessed the ability of these protocols to identify cases of IA in
a busy emergency department during the 2 weeks following
initial identification of patients with IA in the Washington,
D.C., area. Both protocols identified the documented cases of
IA seen at our institution, but the Inova Fairfax criteria would
have screened only 4 patients at a cost of $1900, whereas the
Cornell criteria would have screened 273 patients at a cost of
$126,025. In the editorial accompanying the Cornell protocol,
Sox [8] noted that “If a bioterrorism attack occurs in the mean-
time, we have a triage algorithm that seems safe, but is probably
inefficient” (p. 1). Our study supports that statement, because
26% of patients with possible signs or symptoms of IA would
have been screened by the Cornell protocol, compared with the
∼0.5% of patients who would have been screened by the Inova
Fairfax screening guidelines.
Using a simple checklist of IA symptoms offers several ad-
vantages over the 3-tier algorithm. First, a checklist approach
assures that each of the recognized symptoms of IA is assessed
in each patient, and, therefore, it better fits the concepts of
syndromic surveillance. Second, the checklist approach avoids
the necessity of an algorithm with multiple branch-points and
instead focuses on the simple issue of labeling each patient as
having or not having 5 symptoms plus fever and tachycardia.
Third, this analysis indicates that the Inova Fairfax criteria are
more accurate and cost-effective than the 3-tier algorithm, be-
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cause only 2 additional patients would have been screened if
fever and tachycardia had been included among the symptoms,
and only 27 additional patients would have been screened if
fever and tachycardia had been deleted completely from the
list of clinical factors. In contrast, the Cornell protocol would
have resulted in 271 patients being screened who did not have
the disease, with charges of $126,025.
Although the primary purpose of our study was not to ad-
dress the effect of occupational or environmental exposure on
screening and treatment, we did find that 250 (22%) of the
1127 patients evaluated were either postal employees or worked
in the Hart Senate Office Building (i.e., the site of the anthrax-
laden letter addressed to Senator Daschle.) Of these patients,
239 had 4 clinical symptoms of IA. However, 2 postal em-
ployees had 5 symptoms plus fever and tachycardia and had
PCR-confirmed diagnoses of IA. In this admittedly limited sam-
ple, these data suggest that the use of occupation alone as a
screening condition would have performed similarly to use of
either the Cornell protocol or the criterion of3 clinical symp-
toms of IA.
This study, like most, is subject to certain limitations. First,
although it assesses the accuracy and cost among the population
presenting to a specific emergency department, it is possible
that these results may not apply to other populations. Second,
because a rigorous patient questionnaire was not used proac-
tively in the evaluation of patients with potential IA, it is pos-
sible that patients who appeared to be less seriously ill were
questioned less extensively and may, in fact, have had more
symptoms of IA than were captured in the medical record. If
such questionnaires had been used, there might well have been
more patients identified with 5 symptoms of IA, thereby in-
creasing the percentage of patients screened. This screening
approach (i.e., use of the tachycardia and fever criteria) should
not be applied to patients with a heart block or a pacemaker,
those who have received b-blockers, or those who have ingested
antipyretics within 6 h before presentation. Finally, we do not
know whether the criteria of 5 symptoms plus fever and
tachycardia would apply in other outbreaks involving different
strains of B. anthracis.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study supports the
concept that patients who may have been exposed to anthrax
spores during this bioterrorism-related outbreak could have
been safely screened for diagnosis and treatment on the basis
of the presence or absence of 5 clinical symptoms of IA plus
the presence of fever (temperature, 38C) and tachycardia.
This study also suggests that the proactive development of sim-
ilar screening and treatment protocols that might be used in
responding to a bioterrorism attack should be developed and
disseminated to primary care physicians and emergency de-
partment physicians, as suggested by Danzig [6] and others.
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